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Abstract
When potential shareholders cannot observe the business conditions of the ﬁrms,
the latter desiring to acquire capital by an IPO and operating under less favourable
business conditions have a strong incentive to appear more successful.
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1 The background
Start–ups in innovative and highly risky industries as the ”young” e–commerce branch
require a substantial amount of capital. Asymmetric information in combination with
informal opacity are the main reason for small ﬁrms being credit rationed (Stiglitz and
Weiss, 1981), so that venture capital has become an important source to small start–up
ﬁrms.
Clearly, the entire relationship between the venture capitalist and the ﬁrm is charac-
terised by asymmetric information leading to problems of moral hazard, adverse selection
or window dressing. A growing amount of literature studies the question of how contracts
and special ﬁnancing instruments should be designed to solve the associated problems.1
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1Often, an initial public offer (IPO) is part of this relationship.2 Normally, (poten-
tial) shareholders cannot directly observe the ﬁrms business conditions (type). Therefore,
ﬁrms wishing to acquire capital by means of an initial public offer (IPO) have to publish
a number of key facts (e.g. the expected revenue) to inform the potential shareholders on
the ﬁrm’s situation. Part of the key facts are also not directly observable by the sharehold-
ers, so that the information asymmetry cannot entirely be removed. Hence, the key facts
and, especially, the price of the shares can be regarded as strategic instruments. Keeping
in mind that venture capitalists often desire to realise their returns during an IPO and are
therefore interested in a high initial value, the break–down of the world stock markets in
the year 2001 gives rise to the notion that asymmetric information during an IPO is indeed
relevant. Surprisingly, the problem of strategic behaviour before and during an IPO has
not received much attention.
The present model suggests that whenever the true business conditions are not observ-
able by the potential shareholders, it is optimal for the ﬁrms and venture capitalists to hide
it from the shareholders.
2 The model
Let the ﬁrm be faced by the following situation: Nature chooses the market conditions
(type) q. With probability r they are favourable (q00) and with probability (1−r) they are
unfavourable (q0), where q00 >q0. The ﬁrm immediately learns about the realisation of the
market conditions. However, this information is private so that the potential shareholder
only knows the probability distribution, which is common knowledge. The IPO and the
price p for the shares are announced when the ﬁrms discover their type. It is assumed that
the price can only take two values: p ∈ {p0,p00} with p0 < p00. After the announcement,
the potential shareholder decides whether or not to buy the shares. In the time following
the IPO, the ﬁrms realise proﬁts according to their business conditions and they distribute
them among the owners for an indeﬁnite time span.
q00-ﬁrms are supposed to always choose the high price p00 and individuals only buy
shares of those ﬁrms.
The proﬁts of a ﬁrm are positively correlated with q, so that p(q0)=:p0 <p00 :=p(q00).
Without loss of generality the number of shares is normalised to unity. The ﬁrm sells
a fraction g, g ∈ (0,1], of shares and keeps the remaining one. All future proﬁts are
entirely distributed among the owners (the shareholder and the ﬁrm). The shareholder
2 Several empirical papers conﬁrm the positive role of a viable IPO market on venture capital activities.
For example Jeng and Wells (2000) ﬁnd that IPOs are the strongest driver of venture capital investing.
Gompers (1998) argues that on reason for the increase in venture capital ﬁnancing in the US during the
last years is a surging market for venture–backed IPOs.
2buying the fraction g of shares receives future payments equivalent to the present value
of å
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t=1 gp/(1+r)t = gp/r, where r is the given discount factor. As the shareholder
only buys q00–ﬁrm shares, the valueW00 of obtaining q00–ﬁrm shares has to be positive, i.e.
W00 =−gp00+gp00/r≥0, whereasthevalueW0 ofbuyingq0–ﬁrmshareshastobenegative,
i.e. W0 = −gp0+gp0/r < 0. The inequalities are consistent if (p00−p0)/r ≥ p00− p0 > 0,
which is assumed to hold true. From the fact that W00 is positive also follows that
p00/r ≥ p00. (1)
The potential shareholder is only willing to buy the shares of a q00–ﬁrm if the discounted
stream of future proﬁts is higher than or equal to the price for the shares.
Consider a q00–ﬁrm. The value of selling a fraction of g shares is U(q00,p00) = gp00+
(1−g)p00/r. If the ﬁrm were to announce a price p0, the shareholder would mistake
the ﬁrm as a q0–type one and not buy the shares. Hence, the value of announcing p0
is U(q00,p0) = p00/r. For the q00–type ﬁrm to always announce the high price p00 it is
necessary that U(q00,p00) ≥U(q00,p0). This condition is satisﬁed iff
p00 ≥ p00/r. (2)
Both conditions (1) and (2) can only be satisﬁed if
p00 = p00/r, (3)
which is supposed to hold true henceforward.
In the separating equilibrium, the ﬁrms reveal their type by the choice of the price
p. The q00–type ﬁrm chooses p00, whereas the q0–type ﬁrm announces the low price p0.
The shareholders’ belief functions are given by µ(q00,p00) = 1 and µ(q0,p0) = 1. As the
potential shareholder only buys shares of a ﬁrm operating under favourable conditions,
a type q0–type ﬁrm does not sell any shares. In this case, its the value of setting p0 is
U(q0,p0)=p0/r. If the ﬁrm were to announce the high price, it would receiveU(q0,p00)=
gp0+(1−g)p0/r. Consequently, a q0–type ﬁrm reveals its type iff U(q0,p0) >U(q0,p00).
Using the payoff functions, this condition can be simpliﬁed to
p0/r > p00. (4)
Theq0–typeﬁrmrevealsitstypeonlyifthediscountedfutureproﬁtsfromtheunfavourable
business conditions are higher than the price for the shares of the q00–type ﬁrm. Insert-
ing equation (3) into the condition (4) shows that this condition can only be satisﬁed if
p00 < p0, which violates the consistency condition. Hence, a separating equilibrium does
not exist.
In a pooling equilibrium, both types of ﬁrms announce the same price of shares. As
the q00–type ﬁrm always chooses the high price p00, the q0–type ﬁrm will do so as well
3in a pooling equilibrium. In this case, the shareholders belief functions are not updated
and equal the probabilities, with which the types are drawn by nature. Consequently, the
shareholders will buy shares with probability r. The q0–type ﬁrm will hide its type if the
expected payoff is higher than or equal to the payoff received when truly signalling its
type. Therefore, it has to be true that r[gp00+(1−g)p0/r]+(1−r)p0/r ≥p0/r. Rearrang-
ing yields gr[p00−p0/r] ≥ 0. Inserting (3) ensues in gr[p00−p0]/r ≥ 0, which is always
satisﬁed.
Sinceaseparatingequilibriumdoesnotexist, theﬁrmsoperatingundertheunfavourable
business conditions always hide their type. It is interesting to note that this result is in-
dependent of the fraction g of shares offered as well as of the probability r with which a
favourable business condition is drawn.
3 Conclusion
The present note demonstrated that the ﬁrms operating under unfavourable conditions
have a strong incentive to hide them whenever potential shareholders cannot observe the
business conditions of the ﬁrms. In the context of an IPO, this result has meaningful
consequences. The ﬁrms are obliged to publish certain key facts, as e.g. the expected
revenues, when an IPO is announced. If the potential shareholders have no means to
verify the truth of these key facts which is indeed a difﬁcult task the publishable key facts
themselves become a strategic instrument. Clearly, the ﬁrms operating under favourable
conditions have an incentive to transmit this fact to the potential shareholders. However,
this will turn out to be a difﬁcult task as the ﬁrms operating under unfavourable business
conditions will just imitate the actions of the ﬁrms facing favourable conditions. Hence,
the publication of key facts is meaningless when they are a strategic instrument.
In addition, as individuals cannot distinguish potentially successful and potentially
unsuccessful ﬁrms, they buy shares at random, i.e. they buy according to the probability
distribution of the types. As a consequence, some promising ﬁrms cannot acquire capital
whereas less successful ﬁrms are listed at the ﬁnancial markets. Since a ﬁrm cannot hide
their business conditions for an indeﬁnite time and the shareholders will eventually learn
the true market conditions, the share price of ﬁrms in unfavourable conditions will be
adjusted.
This line of argumentation can be applied to the problem of the ”young” e–commerce
branch. Associating ﬁrms in the traditional sectors as the q00 types and the ﬁrms in the e–
commerce business as q0 types, e–commerce ﬁrms have an incentive to appear more suc-
cessful than they really are. At the time the shareholders realise the true conditions, most
of the share prices of e–commerce ﬁrm would have to be adjusted downwards. Keeping
in mind the huge share price corrections in the ”new market”, the problem of asymmetric
4information in connection with the role of information as a strategic factor seems to be
relevant.
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